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 We are sleep walking into a situation where over the next decade and a half 
concessional development assistance will disengage from the bulk of the world’s poor. This 
is happening because countries that are graduating into Middle Income status still have 
large numbers of poor people. This new situation, where three quarters of the world’s poor 
live in Middle income Countries, raises fundamental questions about the salience of 
national level achievements in determining global responsibilities toward the poor in each 
nation. They also raise basic questions for the operational rules of access to concessional 
development assistance such as that provided by IDA. This paper sets out the issues, and 
presents a proposal for a new window of IDA which recognizes that poverty persists and 
development problems remain despite the welcome graduation of many countries to Middle 
Income status. 
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 The ongoing shift of global economic weight to “developing countries” has been 
much remarked upon. The transformation of previously Low Income Countries (LICs) to 
Middle income Countries (MICs) has accelerated in the last twenty years. China graduated 
in the late 1990s. Indonesia, India, Vietnam, Ghana are the latest countries to cross the 
threshold. Relatedly of course, there has been a shift in geopolitics. We have gone from G7 
to G8 to G20. A grouping like BRICS has a global salience which it could not possibly 
have had two decades ago. India’s quest for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council is 
no longer seen as quixotic, and indeed the claims of other emerging economic powers like 
Brazil are treated seriously. 
 
 However, despite all this, consider the following stunning stylized fact. Using 
standard official definitions, twenty years ago 90% of the world’s poor lived in LICs. 
Today, three quarters of the world’s poor live in MICs (Sumner, 2010). At one level this 
could be dismissed as nothing more than a cute observation—a matter of classification and 
nomenclature. But it matters. It matters because so much of our framing and thinking about 
global responsibility for the poor is cast in national terms. And this is manifested concretely 
in the operational rules of concessional development assistance. While there are variations 
and gradations, such assistance basically stops when a country crosses the threshold to MIC 
status, irrespective of how many poor still remain in the country, and how poor they are in 
income and non-income dimensions. 
 
 The new global realities mean that if the current rules of access are not changed 
then over the next decade or so concessional development assistance will gradually 
disengage from the vast bulk of the world’s poor. This is not an outcome to be taken 
lightly. It needs to be discussed and debated by analysts, the moral obligations clarified and 
the operational implications of continued engagement (or disengagement) developed as 
policy options. This paper is a contribution to such rethinking, which is now underway in 
LICs, MICs and in development agencies. 
 
 The plan of the paper is as follows:  Section 2 outlines of the evolution of the 
engagement of concessional development assistance with the world’s poor over the next 
decade and a half, relying on the work of Sumner (2010) and Moss and Leo (2010). Section 
3 considers the arguments and counterarguments for continuing aid to MICs. Section 4 
makes a specific proposal for IDA. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Coming Disengagement of Aid and IDA from the Bulk of the World’s Poor 
 Most if not all forms of concessional assistance have rules of access that limit or 
eliminate the availability of support to MICs. While the details vary and may be a little 
different from the exact official definition of the LIC/MIC threshold, graduation to MIC 
status essentially removes access to concessional assistance after a period of around three 
years. For example, the official World Bank threshold between LIC and MIC is $1,005 per 
capita Gross National Income (PCGNI) in 2010. The IDA threshold is a little higher, US 
$1,175 PCGNI in 2010. There are other aspects to IDA access such as access to capital 
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markets, but here I will focus on the PCGNI criterion. The rules of access to IDA on this 
criterion are then specified as follows: 
 
 “….the borrower will continue to access IDA resources on regular terms until the 
GNI per capita continuously exceeds the cutoff for three years.” (World Bank, 
2009, footnote 10) 
 
Further, in a clause that is little appreciated by outsiders, repayment terms harden 
considerably once the threshold is crossed: 
 
 “IDA credits include an acceleration clause, providing for the possibility of 
doubling of principal payments from creditworthy borrowers where per capita 
income remains above eligibility thresholds.” (World Bank, 2009, footnote 6). 
 
This “accelerated repayment clause” has been in IDA loan agreements for a while, but has 
begun to be exercised recently, and effectively halves the maturity of an outstanding loan 
upon graduation. It is perhaps this which “concentrates the mind” for IDA graduands—
their outflows will double upon graduation. And in countries like India, which often has 
“back-to-back” on-lending from IDA to the central government and then to state 
government, it is the repayment of states that doubles. 
 
 What exactly will happen if the IDA rules of graduation continue to apply in the 
coming decade or so? Moss and Leo (2011) have conducted a careful projection analysis 
based on standard assumptions on growth (from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook). 
Their findings are quite startling. We are currently in the middle of the 16th 3-year cycle of 
IDA funding--IDA 16. By the time of IDA 21, around 15 years from now, IDA stalwarts 
such India, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Zambia, Ghana, Kenya, Cambodia, Nicaragua, 
Bangladesh, etc. will have graduated. Around 30 countries will be left in IDA, with one 
third of the current population, 40% of the current allocation, largely African, and many 
that are currently fragile and poor performing. 
 
 Using a number of assumptions and projections on donor flows (essentially, 
continuation of recent trends), allocation rules and country performance (since IDA 
allocations are both need and performance based), Moss and Leo further calculate that the 
per capita allocation of countries that remain will double on average. With this broad 
framework, three possible scenarios are possible: First, with business as usual and 
unchanged rules of access, there will be a bonanza for the countries that do not graduate, 
with aid absorption issues being raised for many if not most. Second, donors could 
maintain current per capita allocation levels and take a “dividend” by reducing their aid 
flows. Or, third, rules of access to IDA could be changed to better deploy resources for the 
poor in graduated countries. 
 
 Sumner (2010) has calculated that in 2007-8 the top ten countries in terms of 
numbers of poor countries were India (456 million), China 2008 (208 million), Nigeria (89 
million), Bangladesh (76 million), Indonesia (66 million), DRC (36 million), Pakistan (35 
million), Tanzania (30 million), Ethiopia (29 million) and Philippines (20 million). Except 
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for Tanzania and Ethiopia, none of these will be eligible for IDA resources after IDA 21. 
Of course, if growth and poverty reduction is faster in graduates than in non-graduates, the 
pattern may evolve. Chandy and Gertz (2011) have provided estimates for patterns of 
global poverty in 2015. They find that in 2015 MICs will account for 55% of the world’s 
poor—and some of their assumptions (e.g. static inequality in MICs), may well overstate 
poverty reduction in MICs. It seems fairly clear that if current patterns and trends persist, 
then IDA will disengage from a large section, perhaps the bulk, of the world’s poor.  
 
 While I have looked at specifics for IDA, it should be equally clear that the same 
fate awaits most other forms of concessional development assistance—many other 
multilaterals (such as the Asian Development Bank) follow IDA’s structure for rules of 
access, and many bilateral are also set to disengage from MICs (e.g. DFID, 2010). 
 
3. Why Continue Aid to the Poor in MICs? Arguments and Counterarguments 
 
 The central normative argument in favor of continuing development assistance to 
MICs stems for the imperative of the non-poor to help the poor, no matter where they are. 
Such “global Utilitarianism” would seek to aid the poor based on their poverty, not their 
nationality. Of course, informational and implementation constraints may mean that 
national PCGNI could be used as a proxy for poverty, or as an indicator for targeting 
resources most effectively towards the poor. This argument is developed in Kanbur and 
Sumner (2011). But, in this perspective, the national state per se would have no moral 
salience in and of itself in determining global moral responsibility towards the poor in that 
nation. They would command our attention because they were poor, period. The evidence 
on persisting poverty in MICs, based on global absolute standards, would thus call for 
continued aid to them from global resources targeted to poverty reduction. 
 
 Let us now consider counterarguments to this position. First is the counterargument 
that the poor in LICs are in fact poorer than the poor in MICs, so they should still command 
the lion’s share of the aid resources. Now, the evidence is that along many non-income 
dimensions poverty is as severe in some MICs as in LICs. But the basic point is that this is 
an empirical question, not one of moral salience of LIC status per se. One should also 
highlight here that the issue is not one of income versus non-income dimensions of 
wellbeing. Take any dimension of wellbeing, or take any multidimensional index, and 
construct a threshold analogous to the “MIC/LIC” threshold on that dimension. If there are 
individuals who are poor in the newly defined “MICs”, the fundamental question will not 
go away. 
 
 Another counterargument is that persistence of poverty in MICs is surely an 
indicator of lack of political will—lack of resources cannot be an issue by definition since 
the country is now a MIC. The response to this counter argument depends on how it is 
interpreted. If MIC status together with persistent poverty is taken as evidence of leakage 
of aid resources in their impact on poverty reduction, then of course this should have a 
consequence for aid allocation even with an objective of reducing poverty globally, no 
matter where it occurs. Such modification of targeting rules when efficiency of resources 
use differs is well appreciated. However, if MIC status together with persistence of poverty 
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is taken to have moral salience above and beyond the targeting argument, that the poor in 
non-poor countries are less deserving of global resources because the primary claim should 
be on their own nation state, then this is a different category of counter argument. 
 
 A powerful counterargument, one that will play well in the political arena, is that 
many MICs have their own aid programs: 
 “Every so often something comes along which shows that almost everything you 
know about a subject is wrong. Such a development is happening in the world of foreign 
aid. It is a proposal by India to set up its own aid agency to distribute $11 billion over the 
next five to seven years. That’s aid from India….This would be a departure. For decades, 
India was the world’s biggest aid recipient. Now, it is likely to join Brazil, Russia and 
China in using aid to win friends and influence people abroad.” (The Economist, August 
13, 2011). 
 The Economist entitled this article, “India is thinking about setting up its own aid 
agency. Why should others give aid to India?” It is clear that from a political optic this is a 
killer counterargument. It would be difficult indeed to convince Northern taxpayers to give 
aid to India, when India itself gives aid. 
 However, consider the following rational argument, based again on the objective of 
reducing poverty no matter where it occurs. We know, of course, that there are leakages in 
aid. Some of the aid intended for the poor does not in fact reach the poor. Some of it 
finances the Presidential jet, or the acquisition of arms. The fungibility of resources makes 
this all the more potent, and it holds true in all countries, LICs or MICs. Attempts to 
minimize leakages abound in aid programs, from micro level monitoring to broad policy 
reforms. Now, one can think of worse forms of leakage than India giving aid to even poorer 
countries. At least, this is something to be discussed on a case by case basis, without taking 
a blanket position that being an aid donor is incompatible with being aid recipient. The 
Economist also ends up taking a more open position on aid to MICs: 
 “For Westerners, justifying aid will be harder. But there is a reason to give: like 
trade, aid benefits from specialisation and comparative advantage. Emerging countries, 
with recent experience to draw upon, might do a better job of infrastructure spending. The 
West should focus more on policies and good governance (something many poorer Indian 
states are crying out for). There is a new world of aid but over a billion people remain poor; 
they still need help, even if some of them live in countries that now give aid as well as get 
it.” (The Economist, August 13, 2011). 
 While I have considered arguments in favor of continued aid to the poor in MICs on 
a type of global Utilitarianism which has as its objective poor people no matter which 
nation they live in, the counter arguments have the feel of ascribing a moral salience to the 
nation state in and of itself. There is lively debate on these issues in the conceptual and 
philosophical domain. Most interesting, perhaps, is John Rawls’s departure from his 
“difference principle”, put forward in A Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1971), when discussing 
international relations. In The Law of Peoples (Rawls, 1999), he does not advance a “global 
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difference principle”, which would focus attention on the poorest in the world no matter 
where they lived. Rather, the focus is on “well ordered peoples”, whose obligation is to 
help other communities become “well ordered peoples.” The tension between individuals 
and “peoples” is brought to the fore, and the salience of “peoples” in the international arena 
is highlighted.  
 From a quite different perspective, Miller (2010) departs from (what he considers to 
be) the extreme position of Peter Singer (1979) on the obligations of the well off no matter 
where they are to help the poor no matter where they are. Miller (2010) argues that a firmer 
foundation for aid is provided by focusing on international relations where one group of 
people is exploiting another. This is what establishes a moral basis for assistance, as redress 
for exploitative relations. In this view, therefore, whether a nation was MIC or LIC would 
be irrelevant; what would matter in establishing the moral case for aid would be the nature 
of the relations between that country and potential donors. 
 To conclude this section, then, much turns on the salience of the nation state per se 
in structuring the nature of global obligations to the poor. From one perspective, a poor 
country has claim on global resources, and a country that is not poor does not, irrespective 
of the nature of poverty at the individual level in these countries. From the other 
perspective, it is a poor person who exercises claim on global resources, irrespective of the 
nation in which he or she lives. Where one comes down along this divide will determine 
one’s views on aid to middle income countries. 
4. The Future of IDA—Windows of Opportunity 
 Faced with the scenario mass graduation of countries from IDA over the next 
decade and a half, Moss and Leo (2011) offer three possible scenarios: 
 “ (1) Stay the Course and Hope for the Best: IDA could maintain its current 
allocation system and continue to argue every three years for replenishments at the current 
(or even higher) levels….(2) Declare Success and Shrink Over Time: Another option is to 
simply scale IDA down to meet the needs and size of the smaller client base. If IDA flows 
were held constant real per capita terms, then IDA-21 may in fact be the last replenishment 
for regular donor contributions….(3) Launch A New Regional/Global Public Goods 
Window within IDA: A third option is for IDA to complement – or even replace – its 
country-based lending model with a wholly different approach for funding global public 
goods (GPGs)….” (pp. 17-18). 
 The use of development aid resources to support addressing cross-border 
externalities and global public goods is of course a long standing issue in the development 
discourse (see for example, Kanbur, 2003; Kremer, 2006). However, the discussion in the 
present paper suggests strongly that IDA resources could also be targeted to the poor in 
MICs. 
 Specifically, consider the following proposal. Between the current IDA threshold 
and twice this threshold, IDA resources would be available for projects and 
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interventions targeted specifically to the poor—for example through projects focused 
on regions whose per capita income is below the IDA threshold, or through projects 
focused on sectors such as basic health and basic education which would reach the 
poorest of the poor. 
 If the above proposal is accepted then IDA would have two windows. The first 
window would be the standard window accessible only to countries below the basic IDA 
threshold. The usual IDA procedures would apply to this window. The second window 
would be accessible by countries above the IDA threshold but below twice the threshold. If 
one further accepts the thrust of the Moss and Leo (2011) “third option”, there could be a 
third window for GPGs. These are the windows of opportunity for IDA’s future, in the face 
of increased disengagement from the developing world and from poor people around the 
world. 
 There is much to be worked out on the implementation of this proposal, but (i) it 
still fits within the “per capita income threshold” framework, (ii) it merely intensifies the 
attempts at poverty targeting that already exist within IDA through regional and sectoral 
focus, (iii) it allows and invites greater focus on newer approaches to aid such as Cash on 
Delivery (COD—see Birdsall and Savedoff, 2010), and (iv) it puts a cap on continued 
access at around the midpoint of the range between the Lower Middle Income (LMIC) and 
Upper Middle Income (UMIC) thresholds. 
 Among the operational issues that would arise are: 
(1) Exact delineation of poor regions or poverty oriented sectors. Regional per capita 
income could be used to target projects within a country. Only those regions that have 
not crossed the basic IDA threshold would be eligible. In India, for example, the 
poorest states would continue to have access to IDA until India’s per capita GNI 
exceeded twice the IDA threshold. But for implementation this would require 
strengthening of sub-national income accounts. 
(2) Performance based allocation for this window of IDA resources. Would the same 
allocation rules (based on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment—CPIA) 
apply? Or might modified performance indicators, focused directly on poverty 
reduction outcomes, be more appropriate? (For an argument in favor of strongly 
outcomes-based approaches, see Kanbur, 2005. See also Leo, 2010). 
(3) Some countries that have graduated but have not crossed the UMIC threshold will 
once again have access to IDA. Bringing these countries back into the IDA fold will 
require the appropriate reengagement, although of course there is IBRD engagement 
in any case. 
(4) On the funding side, the issue of how much should be allocated to the new window, 
and on what criteria, will need to be discussed and worked out. Can donors earmark 
their contributions for a window? Or would the overall replenishment be allocated 
according to operational needs and performance criteria? 
(5) More generally, governance structures for the new window, to which a limited 
number of MICs would have access, would need to be worked out. 
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These operational issues are challenging, of course, but they will need to be addressed if 
IDA is not to become disengaged with the bulk of the world’s poor. 
5. Conclusion 
 On a business as usual scenario, IDA will find itself focused on a small number of 
countries that do not contain the bulk of the world’s poor. The same is true of most other 
forms of concessional development assistance. In order to prevent this disengagement, we 
need to start discussing the possibility of continued access to IDA resources for Lower 
Middle Income Countries, through a window that focuses on the poorest regions within 
countries, and on sectors that target the poorest. This window should be considered in 
parallel with other proposals, for example to create a window for Global Public Goods. 
 Such an evolution will not be easy for IDA. The structure of the rules of access has 
been pretty much unchanged for 50 years, and change is not easy. The new window will 
face opposition from the beneficiaries of business as usual—the countries that do not 
graduate over the next decade will get a sharp increase if donor flows continue. It may face 
opposition from donors, who may prefer to “declare victory” and reduce their 
contributions. This is an attractive option given the severe financial difficulties they face, 
and the argument that MICs have sufficient resources, and that some of them have their 
own aid programs, will play powerfully with domestic audiences. Further, the current 
policy is clear cut. As always, the alternatives are not so well defined and a number of 
options are possible. Each option will favor different beneficiaries in different ways, 
making it difficult for a coalition to form in favor of change. Finally, one should not 
underestimate the strength of feeling in some elite quarters of the new MICs that accessing 
concessional development resources does not comport with their self image and an 
emerging global role (for example, membership of G20). 
 However, as IDA is left with an ever smaller group of countries while poverty 
problems persist in MICs and need attention, global concern, and IDA’s own self interest, 
requires a profound reflection on the rules and policies according to which it operates. This 
paper is a contribution to that process.  
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